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Abstract 
  The appeals process is employed in many organizations, including administrative 
agencies, regulatory authorities, sports organizations, and private companies. This paper 
examines the dual role of the appeals process in correcting errors and inducing 
compliance in principal-agent relationships in the presence of imperfect performance 
evaluation. Some surprising results emerge. For example, appeals may be denied even if 
the appeals process is quite accurate and costless. An increased accuracy of initial 
observation may reduce welfare. Furthermore, welfare can increase as the cost of the 
appeals process increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    11.  Introduction 
Social scientists (e.g., Aram and Salipante, 1981; Okun, 1975) have long considered 
justice (fairness) as a basic requirement for the effective functioning of organizations. A 
fundamental principle of organizational justice is correctness (Sheppard, Lewicki, and 
Minton, 1992). The objective of this paper is to examine the dual role of the appeals 
process in enhancing justice and securing compliance in principal-agent relationships in 
the presence of imperfect performance evaluation. Justice is measured as the correctness 
of the performance evaluation. 
I consider a simple principal-agent relationship where a risk-neutral employer 
induces a risk-neutral employee to achieve a certain level of performance under limited 
liability. The employer requires at least a minimum performance from all employees, but 
prefers to induce a superior (and more costly) performance from a high-productivity 
employee. The employer cannot observe the employee’s productivity, and can only 
measure his performance imperfectly. Consequently, incorrect performance evaluations 
may arise. In contrast, the employee is privately informed about his own productivity and 
his effort at work, and can observe his performance perfectly. The employer’s welfare 
depends on both her profit and the perceived justice within her organization. I examine 
the effect of an appeals process where the employee is allowed to lodge an appeal when 
he is initially found shirking. Four primary observations emerge from the analysis.  
  First, the merit of the appeal process largely depends on the employer’s concern 
for justice (i.e., correctness). In a standard principal-agent model, the employer’s optimal 
strategy would be to audit an employee’s performance when he claims to have high 
productivity and is initially found to have delivered superior performance. The employee 
    2is rewarded only if the audit also reveals superior performance. Doing so maximizes the 
possibility of penalizing a shirking employee and minimizes the cost of securing 
compliance. However, this auditing strategy increases evaluation errors when the audit is 
imperfect. The reason is that in equilibrium a high-productivity employee always delivers 
superior performance. Therefore, the audit is triggered by–and may mistakenly reverse– 
correct initial evaluations. In contrast, the appeals process allows an employee to appeal 
when he is initially found shirking (an event that in equilibrium occurs only as a result of 
evaluation errors). Hence, the appeals process is triggered by–and can reverse–incorrect 
initial evaluations. When the employer cares enough about the correctness of the 
performance evaluation, the appeals process becomes the optimal strategy. 
 Second, the employee may initially be paid more for minimum performance than 
for superior performance. The reason is that, when the appeals process is sufficiently 
accurate, the employer delivers the greatest reward only to an employee who is found in 
the appeals process to have delivered superior performance. Doing so best limits the rent 
the employee derives from evaluation errors. However, the employer may deliver a 
positive payment when the employee is found to have delivered minimum performance in 
the initial stage to prevent one who has truly delivered minimum performance from 
appealing. 
 Third, surprisingly, more accurate initial evaluations may reduce the employer’s 
welfare. This is because increased accuracy of the initial evaluation provides more 
opportunities for dishonest employees to appeal than for honest employees. 
Consequently, more accurate initial evaluations may restrict the employer’s ability to 
reward different performance levels differentially through the appeals process.  
    3Fourth, the appellant bears all the costs of the appeals process and the employer’s 
welfare can increase as the cost of appeals increases. The cost of appealing can act as a 
forfeitable bond an employee must post in order to appeal, which helps deter a shirking 
employee from appealing. As a result, the employer’s welfare can increase as the cost of 
the appeals process increases when she can impose a large share of the cost of the appeals 
process on the appellant. 
Shavell (1995) studies the role of the appeals process as a means of error 
correction in judicial settings where either parties disappointed with the decision of a 
first-order tribunal can seek reconsideration before a higher tribunal. In contrast, I study 
the role of the appeals process in both reducing evaluation errors and securing 
compliance in a principal-agent setting where an agent can seek the principal’s 
reconsideration of her initial decision. Daughety and Reinganum (2000) examine judicial 
decision making in a hierarchical judicial system. In their model, the role of an appeals 
court is to use the defendant’s choice about appeal to improve its estimate of the superior 
court’s preferred interpretation of the law. In my model, both the initial evaluation and 
the appeals process serve to measure an employee’s performance. Spitzer and Talley 
(2000) analyze a hierarchical system of judicial auditing where an appeals court is 
concerned with imprecision and ideological bias of a trial court. In contrast, there is no 
difference in ideology between the initial evaluation and the appeals process in my 
model. Polinsky and Shavell (2000) incorporate the notion of fairness of sanction into a 
standard model of enforcement and show that the concern for fairness not only affects the 
magnitude of sanctions but also influences the optimal probability of enforcement. The 
    4main concern for fairness in this paper is the correctness of evaluation instead of the 
magnitude of punishment. 
Cremer (1995) shows that better information about the performance of an agent 
may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats and weaken the agent’s 
incentive. In this paper, increased accuracy of the initial evaluation weakens incentives 
because it restricts an industrious employee’s access to the appeals process (a favorable 
lottery) more than it does to a shirking employee. 
Section 2 describes the central elements of the model. Section 3 presents the 
optimal contract without an appeals process as a benchmark. Section 4 examines the 
effect of the appeals process. Section 5 discusses the employer’s preference between the 
appeals process and auditing. Section 6 concludes the paper with future research 
directions. The proofs of all formal conclusions are in the Appendix. 
 
2. The model 
A risk-neutral employer induces a risk-neutral employee to achieve a certain level of 
performance Q.  ) , ( Q e α  denotes the level of effort required to achieve performance Q 
when the employee’s productivity is α . More effort is required to produce higher quality, 
regardless of the employee’s productivity, so  ) , ( Q eQ α > 0. More effort is also required 
to achieve a specified level of performance the lower is the employee’s producitivty, so 
) , ( Q e α α < 0. The employee’s productivity α  is the realization of a binary random 
variable. High productivity,  H α , is realized with probability  H μ , while low 
productivity, L α , is realized with probability  L μ , where  H L α α < < 0  and  1 = + L H μ μ .  
The employee is privately informed about his productivity α and effort e. The 
    5employee’s marginal cost of effort is assumed to be constant and is normalized to unity, 
regardless of his productivity. The employee’s opportunity wage is zero.  
There is an exogenous, minimum performance level   that the employer 
requires of all employees. The employer prefers an exogenous higher performance level 
 from the high-productivity employees, but not the low-productivity employees, 
because the extra benefit the employer derives from the increased performance exceeds 
the incremental cost of the superior performance for the high-productivity employees but 
not for the low-productivity employees.
1 Minimum performance could be basic duties 
such as arriving at work on time and doing routine assignments, but superior performance 
might entail outstanding creativity or efficiency. The employer cannot evaluate the 
superior performance perfectly, but can observe perfectly (and therefore deter) any 
performance below the minimum performance. Conditional on the employee’s actual 
performance being  , the evaluation outcome is   with probability 
L Q
H Q
H Q H Q
2
1
> H p  and   
with probability  ; conditional on the employee’s performance being  , the 
evaluation outcome is   with probability 
L Q
H p − 1 L Q
H Q
2
1
< L p  and   with probability  . J 
denotes the loss of justice due to an evaluation error.  
L Q L p − 1
The employer pays the employee with a transfer payment T which can vary with 
the employee’s announcement of his productivity and the employer’s evaluation. 
Institutional or legal restrictions impose a lower bound on the employee’s compensation. 
For simplicity, we assume the all payment must be nonnegative. The employee’s utility 
function is   which is the payment he receives, T, minus the cost of his effort, e. 
The employer’s welfare function is 
e T U − =
J T Q V T Q W − − = ) ( ) , (  which is her profit from 
    6performance   minus the payment she delivers and any loss of justice due to evaluation 
errors.  
Q
The timing of the model is as follows: (1) The employee observes his productivity 
α . (2) The employer offers a contract specifying the payment T as a function of the 
employee’s announcement of his productivity and the evaluation outcome. (3) The 
employee announces his productivity. (4) The employee chooses effort e and delivers 
performance. (5) The employer evaluates the employee’s performance. (6) The employee 
is paid based upon the evaluation outcome and his ex ante announcement. I abstract from 
the appeals process until section 4. 
 
3. The optimal contract without an appeals process 
3.1. The optimal contract with perfect evaluation 
Let   and   denote the payments the employer delivers to the employee when the 
evaluation of his performance are   and  , respectively. When the employer can 
evaluate the employee’s performance perfectly, the optimal payment structure is 
characterized by the following equations as in standard principal-agent models: 
H T L T
H Q L Q
  ) , ( L L L Q e T α = ;  and                 (3.1) 
  ) , ( L L H Q e e T α + Δ =                         (3.2) 
 where  ) , ( ) , ( L H H H Q e Q e e α α − = Δ . Equation (3.1) indicates that the low-
productivity employee receives no rent. Equation (3.2) implies that the high-productivity 
employee receives positive rent because of his private information about his superior 
productivity. I will call the optimal outcome (contract) in this setting the second-best 
outcome (contract).  
    73.2. The optimal contract with imperfect evaluation 
Now consider the optimal contract when the employer cannot evaluate the employee’s 
performance perfectly. Before formally modeling the employer’s problem, I present an 
observation regarding the optimal mechanism. 
 
 Observation  1: The employer evaluates the employee’s performance only when 
he claims to be a high-productivity employee.  
 
  The intuition behind Observation 1 is the following. When the employee claims to 
be low-productivity, he is required to deliver minimum performance. He has no incentive 
to deliver superior performance, as higher performance demands higher effort. Therefore, 
evaluating the employee’s performance when he claims to be a low-productivity 
employee is unnecessary. 
 Let 
H  and   denote the payments for an employee who claims to be a high-
productivity employee when he is found to have delivered superior and minimum 
performance, respectively. Let   denote the payment for an employee who claims to be 
a low-productivity employee. Then the employer’s problem, labeled [P-NA], is 
H T
H
L T
L T
{ } { }
L
L L
H
L H
H
H H H H
T T T
T Q V J T p T p Q V W Max
L H
L
H
H
− + + − − − = ) ( ) )( 1 ( ) (
, ,
μ μ              (3.3) 
subject to the standard participation conditions and incentive compatibility conditions 
that guarantee the employee’s participation and compliance regardless of his 
productivity
2. In addition, all payments must be non-negative due to the limited liability. 
  The properties of the optimal contract in [P-NA] are presented in Observation 2. 
 
 Observation  2: The solution to [P-NA] has the following features:   
(i)  The loss of justice due to evaluation errors is  J pH H ) 1 ( − μ ; 
    8(ii)  When 
) , (
1
L L L
H
Q e
e
p
p
α
Δ
+ ≥ , limits on liability and imperfect performance 
evaluation do not affect the employer’s expected payment; 
(iii)  When 
) , (
1
L L L
H
Q e
e
p
p
α
Δ
+ < , the employee receives 
L H p p
e
−
Δ
 when 
evaluation reveals superior performance, and zero when the evaluation 
reveals minimum performance. The employee receives positive expected 
rent regardless of his productivity; 
(iv)  An employee who admits to be low-productivity receives a fixed and 
positive payment for his performance. 
  
  To understand Observation 2, it is important to understand how the imperfect 
evaluation affects the employee’s behavior. When the performance evaluation is 
imperfect, a high-productivity employee may exaggerate his performance when he 
actually delivers only minimum performance, and a low-productivity employee may 
exaggerate both his productivity and performance.  
  When the evaluation is relatively accurate (
L
H
p
p
 is large), evaluation errors are 
relatively rare. When the incremental effort the high-productivity employee must exert to 
achieve the superior performance  e Δ  is small, the employee’s benefit from shirking is 
small.  Furthermore, when the low-productivity employee must exert substantial effort to 
achieve minimum performance (i.e., when  ) , ( L L Q e α  is large), he receives a large 
payment for his participation and his benefit from pretending to be a high-productivity 
employee is relatively small. Hence, if 
) , (
1
L L L
H
Q e
e
p
p
α
Δ
+ ≥ , the employer can ensure the 
    9employee truthfully announces his productivity and delivers appropriate performance by 
imposing a relatively small penalty when the evaluation reveals minimum performance. 
Consequently, limits on liability do not reduce the employer’s expected welfare. 
 In  contrast,  when 
) , (
1
L L L
H
Q e
e
p
p
α
Δ
+ < , the employer would have to either impose 
a large penalty when the evaluation reveals minimum performance or raise her payments 
in other occasions in order to induce the employee’s compliance. When large penalties 
are not feasible, the employer has to deliver a larger expected payment than in the 
second-best contract. Consequently, the employee receives positive rent regardless of his 
productivity.  
  To best demonstrate the effect of the appeal process, the rest of the paper focuses 
on situations where the limits on liability are constraining. In other words, Assumption 1 
is made for the rest of the paper. 
 
 Assumption  1: 
) , (
1
L L L
H
Q e
e
p
p
α
Δ
+ < . 
 
4. The appeals process 
This section examines an appeals process which allows the employee to lodge an appeal 
when he is found shirking. Upon the employee’s appeal, the employer launches an 
investigation about the employee’s performance at certain cost. Call this setting “the 
appeals setting.” Conditional on the employee’s performance being  , the investigation 
outcome is   with probability   and   with probability 
H Q
H Q H H p a L Q H H p a − 1 ; conditional 
on the employee’s performance being  , the investigation outcome is   with  L Q H Q
    10probability   and   with probability  L L p a L Q L L p a − 1 .   and   measure the difference 
between the accuracy of the appeals process and that of the initial evaluation. The appeals 
process normally has access to the same information that the initial evaluation had plus 
additional information. Therefore, I assume   and 
H a L a
1 > H a 1 < L a , i.e., the appeals process 
is more accurate than the initial evaluation. Let   denote the total cost of the appeals 
process which includes the relevant cost of both the employer and the appellant. Let   
and   denote the payments for superior performance and minimum performance in the 
appeals process, respectively. Denote the share of the cost of the appeals process borne 
by the employer as 
C
A
H T
A
L T
r .  The sequence of actions of the employer and the employee in this 
setting is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1. Sequence of actions] 
 
  Before proceeding, I present an observation regarding the appeals process. 
 Observation  3: In the optimal appeals process, an employee who has delivered 
minimum performance never appeals.
 3    
  Suppose an employee who has delivered minimum performance appeals when the 
initial evaluation reveals minimum performance. The expected payoff the employee 
receives in the appeals process is  . Rather than 
admitting an appeal, the employer will prefer to pay the employee 
 in the initial stage when he is found to have delivered 
minimum performance. Doing so does not alter either the expected payment received by 
the employee nor his incentive to deliver performance, but avoids the cost of the appeals 
C r T p a T p a
A
H L L
A
L L L ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − + −
C r T pL a T p a
A
H L
A
L L L ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − + −
    11process that would be incurred if the low-productivity employee appeals. Therefore, an 
employee who has delivered minimum performance never appeals in the optimal appeals 
process.  
 Given Observation 3, the employer’s problem in the appeals setting, labeled [P-
A], can be modeled as follows: 
{ } ] ) )( 1 ( )[ 1 ( ) ( , rC J T p a T p a p T p Q V W Max
A
L H H
A
H H H H
H
H H H H + + − + − − − = μ  
{ }
L
L L T Q V − + ) ( μ                   (4.1) 
subject to 
0 ) , ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( ≥ − − − − + − + ≡ H H
A
L H H
A
H H H H
H
H H H Q e C r T p a T p a p T p U α ; IRH 
0 ) , ( ≥ − ≡ L L
L
L Q e T U α ;            I R L  
) , ( ) 1 ( L H
H
L L
H
H L H Q e T p T p U α − − + ≥ ;          I C H 1  
) , ( H L
L
L Q e T U α − ≥ ;         I C L 1  
) , ( H H
L
H Q e T U α − ≥ ;            I C H 2  
) , ( ) 1 ( L L
H
L L
H
H L L Q e T p T p U α − − + ≥ ;        I C L 2  
) , ( L H
L
H Q e T U α − ≥ ;            I C H 3  
) , ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( H L
A
L H H
A
H H H H
H
H H L Q e C r T p a T p a p T p U α − − − − + − + ≥ ;   ICL3 
C r T p a T p a T
A
H L L
A
L L L
H
L ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − + − ≥ ;        I C A  
0 ≥
H
H T ;            L L H H  
0 ≥
H
L T ;            L L H L  
0 ≥
L T ;           LLL 
0 ≥
A
H T ;   a n d            L L A H  
    120 ≥
A
L T .            L L A L  
 With  probability  H μ , the employee has high productivity and achieves superior 
performance. Initially, the employer finds the employee has delivered superior 
performance and pays him   with probability  , and finds he has delivered 
minimum performance and pays him   with probability 
H
H T H p
H
L T H p − 1 . When the high-
productivity employee is found to have delivered minimum performance, he rejects 
payment   and lodges an appeal at a cost of 
H
L T C r) 1 ( − . In the appeals process, the 
employer investigates the employee’s performance. The investigation entails a total cost 
of  . With probability  , the employer finds the high-productivity employee’s 
performance superior in the investigation and delivers payment  ; with probability 
, she mistakenly finds the high-productivity employee has delivered minimum 
performance and pays him   and suffers a loss of J due to the evaluation error. With 
probability 
C H H a p
A
H T
H H p a − 1
A
L T
L μ , the employee has low-productivity and delivers minimum performance. 
Then the employer delivers payment 
L T . Constraints IRH and IRL are the individual 
rationality constraints, which ensure the participation of the employee regardless of his 
productivity. Constraints ICH1-3 and ICL1-3 are the incentive compatibility constraints, 
which ensure the employee truthfully announces his productivity and delivers the desired 
performance. Constraint ICA guarantees a dishonest employee does not appeal. 
Constraints LLHH, LLHL, LLL, LLAH and LLAL ensure the payments are nonnegative 
in both the initial stage and the appeals process. 
  Denote the maximum welfare the employer can realize in [P-A] and [P-NA] as 
A
W  and W , respectively. The employer’s problem is to maximize {
A
W , W }.  
    134.1. A costless appeals process. 
  As a benchmark, I first consider an appeals process involving no cost (i.e., 
). In this case, the merits of admitting appeals depend solely on how much the 
addition of the appeal process improves the evaluation accuracy. The properties of the 
appeals process depend on the accuracy of the appeals process relative to the accuracy of 
the initial evaluation, as Proposition 1 reveals. 
0 = C
 
Proposition 1. When the appeals process is costless, the solution to [P-A] has the 
following features: 
(i)  When the employee’s concern for justice is minimal, she denies any 
appeals if 
H
L
L
H
p
p
a
a
−
−
<
1
1
;
4 
(ii)  An employee claiming high-productivity initially receives no payment 
when the evaluation reveals superior performance, but a positive payment 
when it reveals minimum performance; 
(iii)  Increased accuracy of the initial evaluation can reduce the employer’s 
welfare; 
(iv)  When the appeals process is sufficiently accurate, the employer in 
expectation delivers the second-best payment. 
 
  To understand the conclusions drawn in Proposition 1, consider a situation where 
the limited liability constraints bind. Without the appeals process, the employee receives 
 with probability   when he delivers superior performance, and with probability 
 when he shirks. When the employee is allowed to appeal, the employee receives   
with probability   when he delivers superior performance, and with 
H
H T H p
L p
A
H T
H H H p a p ] 1 [ −
    14probability   when he shirks. When  L L L p a p ] 1 [ −
L
H
L L L
H H H
p
p
p a p
p a p
<
−
−
) 1 (
) 1 (
, i.e., the appeals 
process is not sufficiently more accurate than the initial evaluation, implementing the 
appeals process actually increases the likelihood of rewarding a dishonest employee. 
Nonetheless, implementing the appeals process reduced the expect loss of justice due to 
evaluation errors from  J pH H ) 1 ( − μ  to  J p a p H H H H ) 1 )( 1 ( − − μ . Consequently, when 
H
L
L
H
p
p
a
a
−
−
<
1
1
, the employer implements an appeals process only if she is concerned 
about justice.   
 When 
H
L
L
H
p
p
a
a
−
−
>
1
1
, implementing the appeals process increases the likelihood of 
rewarding an employee who has delivered superior performance and reduces the 
employer’s expected payment by  e
p a p
p a p
p
p
L L L
H H H
L
H
Δ
−
−
−
−
−
]
1
) 1 (
) 1 (
1
1
1
[ . In this case, the 
employer prefers to reward the employee in the appeals process. Hence, the employer 
delivers no payment for superior performance in the initial stage, but a large payment for 
superior performance in the appeals process. Doing so best limits the employee’s rent 
from evaluation errors. Meanwhile, the employer delivers a positive payment for 
minimum performance in the initial stage, but no payment for minimum performance in 
the appeal process. Doing so deters the employee from appealing when he has delivered 
minimum performance.  
  As the initial evaluation becomes more accurate, the employee’s performance is 
less likely found to be minimum when he has delivered superior performance, but more 
likely so when he has delivered minimum performance. Therefore, although it improves 
    15the accuracy in the appeals process, increased accuracy of the initial evaluation reduces 
an industrious employee’s but increases a dishonest employee’s access to the appeal 
process. Consequently, increased accuracy of the initial evaluation can increase the 
employer’s cost of securing compliance.  
  In contrast, the employer’s expected cost of securing compliance and loss of 
justice always decreases in the accuracy of the appeals process. When 
H H
L L
L L L
H
p p
p p
Q e
e
a
a
) 1 (
) 1 (
) , (
1
−
−
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡ Δ
+ ≥
α
, the employer in expectation delivers the second-best 
payment.  
 
4.2. A costly appeals process. 
When the appeal process is costly, the employer’s welfare will depend on the cost 
of the process, the allocation of the cost between the employer and the appellant, and the 
accuracy of the appeals process. Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal cost allocation 
between parties in an appeals process. 
 
Proposition 2. In the appeals setting, it is desirable to impose all the cost of the 
appeals process on the appellant.
 5 
 
The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is straightforward. Since the investigation 
in the appeals process is more like to reveal superior performance when the appellant has 
delivered superior performance than when he has delivered minimum performance, an 
employee who has delivered superior performance receives higher expected payment 
from appealing than one who has not. Since the employee appeals only if his expected 
gain from appealing is larger than his cost of appealing, imposing a larger share of the 
    16cost on the appellant helps prevent an employee who has delivered only minimum 
performance from appealing. Therefore, the employer always prefers the appellant to 
bear all the costs of the appeals process, which can be viewed as a forfeitable bond that 
must be posted in order to appeal. This forfeitable bond relaxes the limited liability 
constraint in the appeals process.  
Although Proposition 2 suggests that it is optimal for the principal to impose all 
the cost of the appeals process on the appellant, in many settings, especially 
administrative and regulatory settings, the principal is often restricted from doing so for 
political or social reasons. So I will consider r  as exogenous for the employer in the 
model and examine how r  affects the properties of an appeals process. 
Proposition 3 characterizes the upper bound of the cost of the appeals process for 
implementing the appeals process to be optimal. 
 
Proposition 3: The employer optimally denies any appeals when 
J p a
p p p
Q e p p e p
C H H
L H H H
L L L H L +
− −
− − Δ
>
) )( 1 (
) , ( ) (
μ
α
. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is the following. The maximum value of an 
appeals process is its effect on justice plus the difference between the employer’s 
expected payment in the second-best contract and that in an optimal contract without the 
appeals process, which is  J p a p
p p
Q e p p e p
H H H H
L H
L L L H L ) 1 (
) , ( ) (
− +
−
− − Δ
μ
α
. The 
employer’s expected cost of implementing the appeals process is  C pH H ) 1 ( − μ , where 
) 1 ( H H p − μ  is the probability that an appeal actually occurs. Notice that although the 
employer may impose part of the cost on the appellant, she must compensate the high-
    17productivity employee’s cost of appealing through rewards in the appeals process in order 
to induce superior performance from him. Therefore, when 
J p a
p p p
Q e p p e p
C H H
L H H H
L L L H L +
− −
− − Δ
>
) )( 1 (
) , ( ) (
μ
α
, the employer’s cost of implementing the 
appeals process outweighs her benefit from the appeals process and it is not optimal to 
implement an appeals process no matter how accurate it is.  
When  J p a
p p p
Q e p p e p
C H H
L H H H
L L L H L +
− −
− − Δ
≤
) )( 1 (
) , ( ) (
μ
α
, the properties of the optimal 
contract depend upon the accuracy and the cost of the appeals process. Table 1 identifies 
five main categories regarding the accuracy and the cost of the appeals process. The 
properties of the optimal appeals process are different in each of these categories. 
 
[Table 1. Condition of the Appeals Process] 
 
When the High-accuracy Condition, Medium-accuracy/High-cost condition, or 
Low-accuracy/High-cost condition holds, limits on liability are not constraining because 
of the high accuracy or the high cost of the appeals process. Consequently, the employee 
receives the same expected payment as when the evaluation is perfect.  
In contrast, limits on liability are constraining when the Low-accuracy/Low-cost 
Condition or Medium-accuracy/Low-cost Condition holds. Proposition 4 and Proposition 
5 present the properties of the optimal appeals process under the Low-accuracy/Low-cost 
Condition and the Medium-accuracy/ Low-cost Condition, respectively. 
 
Proposition 4: When the Low-accuracy /Low-cost Condition holds, the solution 
to [P-A] has the following features: 
    18(i)  An employee claiming high-productivity receives a positive payment when the 
initial evaluation reveals superior performance but no payment when it reveals 
minimum performance; 
(ii)  The employee receives a positive payment for superior performance but no 
payment for minimum performance in the appeal process; 
(iii)  The employer’s welfare increases as the cost of the appeals process increases 
when she can impose a large share of the cost on the appellant;  
(iv)  When the employer cannot impose a large share of the cost of appeals on the 
appellant, she implements an appeal process only if her concern for justice is 
substantial. 
 
In the case of a costless appeals process, it has been shown that implementing an 
appeals process increases the likelihood of rewarding a shirking employee and therefore 
increases the employer’s expected payment when 
H
L
L
H
p
p
a
a
−
−
<
1
1
. Hence, when the 
employer’s concern for justice is minimal, the employer should reward the employee in 
the initial stage and preclude appeals by offering no reward if an appeal is lodged. 
However, when the appeals process is costly, the cost of the appeals process born by the 
appellant functions as a forfeitable bond, which relaxes the limited liability constraint in 
the appeals process. The appeals process becomes useful for the employer, even if justice 
is not a concern, because of the associated enhanced ability to penalize the employee 
when he is found to have delivered minimum performance in the appeals process. The 
employer makes full use of the appeals process by delivering no payment (the appellant’s 
bond is forfeited) when minimum performance is found but delivering a positive payment 
    19when superior performance is found in the appeals process. This positive payment is 
increased up to the point where the employee’s expected profit from appealing (the 
difference between expected payment and expected cost of appealing) is zero if he has 
delivered minimum performance. This ensures an employee who has delivered minimum 
performance has no (strict) incentive to appeal. After this point, the limited liability 
constraint in the appeals process binds, and the employer delivers the rest of the payment 
in the initial stage as in the costless appeals process. Hence, when the employee claims to 
be a high-productivity employee, the employer delivers to him a positive payment for 
superior performance but no payment for minimum performance, both in the initial stage 
and in the appeals process. 
The employer’s expected cost of implementing the appeals process has been 
shown to be  C pH ) 1 ( − μ . In expectation the appeals process enables the employer to 
reduce the employee’s rent by 
1
) 1 )( 1 )( 1 (
−
− − −
L
H
L L
H H
H
p
p
C r
p a
p a
p
. Therefore, when 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 − − − <
L L
H H
L
H
H p a
p a
p
p
r μ , the employer’s expected payment decreases as the cost 
of the appeals process increases. Otherwise, the appeal process increases the employer’s 
expected total expenditure (the expected payment plus the expected cost of implementing 
the appeals process) and the employer’s welfare decreases as the cost of the appeals 
process increases. In this case, the employer implements an appeals process only if her 
concern for justice is substantial.  
 
    20Proposition 5: When the Medium-accuracy/Low-Cost Condition holds, the 
solution to [P-A] has the following features:  
(i)  An employee claiming high-productivity receives no payment when the initial 
evaluation reveals superior performance, but a positive payment when it 
reveals minimum performance; 
(ii)  The employer delivers a positive payment for minimum performance in the 
initial stage, but no payment for minimum performance in the appeal process; 
(iii)  The employer’s welfare increases in the cost of the appeals process when she 
can impose a large share of the cost on the appellant;  
(iv)  When the employer cannot impose a large share of the cost of appeals on the 
appellant, she implements a high cost appeal process only if her concern for 
justice is substantial. 
(v)  Increased accuracy of the initial evaluation can reduce the employer’s welfare. 
 
When 
H
L
L
H
p
p
a
a
−
−
>
1
1
, it has been shown that implementing an appeals process 
increases the likelihood of rewarding superior performance. Consequently, the employer 
prefers to reward superior performance in the appeals process. Doing so best limits the 
employee’s rent from evaluation errors. Meanwhile, the employer compensates minimum 
performance in the initial stage to deter an employee who has delivered minimum 
performance from appealing. 
The cost of the appeals process imposed on the appellant helps deter a shirking 
employee from appealing and therefore enables the employer to reward superior 
performance in the appeals process. Consequently, the employer can reduce the 
    21employee’s rent by  C r p
p a p p a p
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expected cost of implementing the appeals process has been shown to be  C pH H ) 1 ( − μ .  
When r  is small so that  ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1
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−
μ , the 
employer’s welfare increases as the cost of the appeals process increases. Otherwise, the 
employer’s welfare decreases as the cost of the appeals process increases. When the 
appeals process becomes sufficiently costly, the employer implements an appeals process 
only if her concern for justice is substantial.  
As 
L
H
a
a
 increases, the employer is less likely to make evaluation errors in the 
appeals process, which reduces the employee’s rent from evaluation errors and the loss of 
justice. Therefore, the employer’s welfare increases as the accuracy of the appeals 
process increases. However, the employer’s welfare can decrease in 
L
H
p
p
. The reason is 
the same as in the case where the appeals process is costless. Increased accuracy of the 
initial evaluation reduces an industrious employee’s but increases a dishonest employee’s 
access to the appeal process. Therefore, increased accuracy of initial evaluation restricts 
the employer’s ability to reward different performance levels differentially through the 
appeals process, and therefore can reduce the employer’s welfare.  
 
5. The appeals process versus auditing 
Optimal auditing policies in the principal-agent framework have been analyzed in the 
economics literature, for example in Townsend (1979), Baiman and Demski (1980), and 
    22Dye (1986). This section discusses how the appeals process differs from an optimal 
auditing strategy and under what conditions the employer prefers an appeals process to 
auditing. Observation 4 presents the optimal auditing policy in this setting if justice is not 
a concern. 
 Observation  4. The employer audits an employee’s performance only when he 
claims to have high-productivity and is initially found to have delivered superior 
performance. The employee is rewarded only if the auditing also reveals superior 
performance. 
  This auditing strategy is optimal because it maximizes the probability of 
penalizing a shirking employee and minimizes the employer’s cost of securing 
compliance in the presence of limited liabilities. Suppose the audit is as accurate as the 
appeals process. Let   and   denote the payments when the audit reveals superior 
performance and minimum performance, respectively. When the employer is concerned 
for justice, her welfare under the auditing strategy is 
i
H T
i
L T
{ } { }
L
L L
H
L H
i
L H H
i
H H H H H H T Q V J T p J T p a T p a p Q V − + + − − + − + − ) ( ) )( 1 ( )] )( 1 ( [ ) ( μ μ . 
                   ( 5 . 1 )  
The expected loss of justice due to evaluation errors under this strategy is 
J p p a p H H H H H )] 1 ( ) 1 ( [ − + − μ  compared to  J pH H ) 1 ( − μ  when the audit is not 
implemented, i.e. the auditing strategy aggravates the loss of justice. The reason is that in 
equilibrium a high-productivity employee always delivers superior performance. 
Therefore, under the “optimal” auditing strategy, the audit in equilibrium is triggered by–
and may mistakenly reverse–correct initial evaluations. When the employer’s concern for 
    23justice is substantial, the above auditing strategy cannot be optimal even though it 
reduces the employer’s cost of securing compliance.
 5  
  In contrast, the appeals process in equilibrium is triggered by–and potentially 
reverses–incorrect initial evaluations as shown in earlier analysis. Furthermore, the 
employer always weakly prefers the optimal appeals process to an auditing strategy 
which audits the employee’s performance when he claims to have high productivity and 
is initially found to have delivered minimum performance. This is because, in the optimal 
appeals process, the employee appeals only when he has actually delivered superior 
performance. Compared to the auditing strategy, the optimal appeals process saves the 
costs of auditing when the initial evaluation is correct. I sum up these observations in 
Observation 5. 
 Observation  5. When the concern for justice is substantial, the employer always 
weakly prefers an appeals process to an auditing strategy. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the role of the appeals process in securing compliance and in 
promoting justice. Four primary observations emerge from the analysis. First, the merit of 
the appeal process largely depends on the employer’s concern for justice. Second, when 
the appeals process is sufficiently accurate, an employee may be paid more initially for 
minimum performance than for superior performance. Third, increased initial observation 
accuracy may reduce the employer’s welfare. Fourth, the appellant bears all the cost of 
appealing in an optimal appeals process and the employer’s welfare can increase as the 
cost of the appealing increases. 
    24  The paper emphasizes the merit of the appeals process in securing compliance and 
in enhancing justice through error corrections. This is not to deny the importance of other 
possible merits of the appeals process. For example, Sheppard (1985) found that the 
capacity to appeal a decision itself vastly improved the perceived fairness of a procedure. 
Research on justice (e.g., Folger, 1987; Greenberg, 1986; Paese, Lind, & Kanfer, 1988) 
has found that perceived procedure fairness affects perception of justice as well as 
subsequent attitudes, regardless of the fairness of the decision itself, in many 
organizational decision contexts and is particular relevant to performance evaluation.  
  This study also abstracts from several factors that might be included in future 
research. First, the study assumes that the employer is able to commit to the appeals 
process. When the employer is not able to commit, there will exist no pure strategy 
separating equilibrium. This is because the employer has no incentive to carry out an 
investigation in the appeals process if only an employee who has delivered superior 
performance appeals.
7 Second, this study focuses on the role of the appeals process in 
securing compliance with a given (exogenous) set of performance standards. How 
optimal standards might vary when appeals are permitted warrants further study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    25FOOTNOTES 
1.  In other words,  ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( L L H L L H L H H H Q e Q e Q V Q V Q e Q e α α α α − < − < − . 
Therefore, it is desirable to induce superior performance from a high-productivity 
employee and minimum performance from a low-productivity employee. 
2.  See Dai (2004) for a detailed formulation and proof of the employer’s problem. 
3.  The employer is assumed to be able to commit to her proposed mechanism as in 
standard principal-agent models.  
4.  Equivalently, the employer can make the payments in the appeals process unattractive 
to the worker so that no appeals will occur. 
5.  Note the cost of the appeals process can be non-monetary resources such as time and 
effort needed to collect supporting evidences. So it suggests that it is optimal to 
impose a larger burden of proof on the appellant. It also suggests that, in a regulatory 
setting, the fact that regulatory hearings usually consume considerable time and 
resources does not necessarily imply that the process is inefficient. This offers 
another explanation for “regulatory bureaucracy”. Sappington (1986) shows that 
regulatory bureaucracy, which makes the regulatory agency difficult to discern the 
firm’s costs, creates incentives for the firm to reduce costs when the regulator does 
not have commitment power. 
6.  When the auditing is costly, the optimal auditing strategy would be randomly auditing 
an employee’s performance when he claims to have high-productivity and is initially 
found to have delivered superior performance. The above arguments would still hold. 
7.  Khalil (1997) analyses a principal-agent model where the principal cannot commit to 
an auditing policy. 
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 Appendix 
I. The Solution to [P-A]:  
1. A costless appeals process: 
It can be readily shown that constraints IRH, ICH1, ICL1, ICH2, ICL3, LLL, and 
LLAH are redundant. Therefore, the Lagrangian of this problem is as follows: 
[ ] { } { }
L
L L
A
L H H
A
H H H H
H
H H H H T Q V J T p a T p a p T p Q V − + + − + − − − = ) ( ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( , μ μ D  
       { } ] ) 1 ( [ 0
H
L L
H
H L
L T p T p T − + − + λ { } ) , ( 1 L L
L Q e T α λ − +  
       { } )] , ( [ ) , ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 2 L H
L
H H
A
L H H
A
H H H H
H
H H Q e T Q e T p a T p a p T p α α λ − − − − + − + +  
       { }L
A
L L L
A
H L L
H
L T p a T p a T ] ) 1 ( [ 3 − + − + λ            (A1) 
A
L
A
H
H
H T T T 6 5 4 λ λ λ + + +
  The first order conditions are: 
0 4 2 0 = + + − − = λ λ λ μ H L H H T p p p H
H D                 (A2) 
0 ) 1 ( 3 0 = + − − = λ λ L T p H
L D                  ( A 3 )  
0 2 1 0 = − + + − = λ λ λ μL T
L D                ( A 4 )  
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 5 3 2 = + − − + − − = λ λ λ μ L L H H H H H H H T p a p a p p a p A
H D             (A5) 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 6 3 2 = + − − − − + − − − = λ λ λ μ L L H H H H H H H T p a p a p p a p A
L D       (A6) 
  The following seven cases are to be analyzed: 
Case I:  0 3 = λ  and  0 4 = λ ; 
Case II:  0 3 = λ  and  0 4 > λ ; 
Case III:  0 3 > λ ,  0 4 = λ , 0 5 = λ  and  0 6 > λ ; 
Case IV:  0 3 > λ ,  0 4 = λ , 0 5 = λ  and  0 6 = λ ; 
  29Case V:  0 3 > λ ,  0 4 = λ , 0 5 > λ  and  0 6 > λ ; 
Case VI:  0 3 > λ ,  0 4 = λ , 0 5 > λ  and  0 6 = λ ; 
Case VII:  0 3 > λ  and  0 4 > λ . 
  Among the seven cases, Case II, Case IV, and Case VI can be ruled out by 
contradictions, and therefore only Case I, Case III, Case V and Case VII are valid cases. 
Case I:  0 3 = λ  and  0 4 = λ ; 
 Substituting  0 3 = λ  and  0 4 = λ  into (A2), (A3) and (A4) and jointly solving these 
three equations provides  1 1 = λ  and  H μ λ = 2 . Substituting  1 1 = λ ,  H μ λ = 2 , 0 3 = λ  and 
0 4 = λ  into (A5) and (A6) provides  0 5 = λ  and  0 6 = λ . 
1 1 = λ  and  H μ λ = 2  imply that  the constraints IRL and ICH are binding. Therefore,  
  ;  a n d                     ( A 7 )   )
)
, ( L L
L Q e T α =
  .            (A8)  , ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( L L
A
L H H
A
H H H H
H
H H Q e e T p a T p a p T p α + Δ = − + − +
  Equations (A7) and (A8) indicates the employer is able to in expectation deliver 
the second-best payment to the employee. For this case to be true, we must have 
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Case III:  0 3 > λ ,  0 4 = λ , 0 5 = λ  and  0 6 > λ ; 
  30  From (A5), we have  
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Jointly solving (A2) and (A3) provides  
  L
H
L H p
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p ) 1 )( ( 2 3 − − = μ λ λ .                           (A12) 
Since 0 3 > λ  and  0 2 ≠ − H μ λ . Therefore, 
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.                               (A13) 
In this case, the ratio of the likelihoods of rewarding an honest employee and a shirking 
employee are the same with or without the appeals process. Hence, the employer delivers 
the same expected payment with or without the appeals process.  
 
Case V:  0 3 > λ ,  0 4 = λ , 0 5 > λ  and  0 6 > λ ; 
Jointly solving (A2) and (A3) provides 
  L
H
L H p
p
p ) 1 )( ( 2 3 − − = μ λ λ .                         (A.14)
 
(A5) provides 
  H H H H L L p a p p a ) 1 )( ( 2 3 5 − − − = μ λ λ λ .                      (A15) 
0 5 > λ  requires 
H
L
L
H
p
p
a
a
−
−
<
1
1
. In this case, the ratio of the likelihoods of rewarding an 
honest employee and a shirking employee is even lower when the appeals process is 
incorporated. Hence, the employer delivers a larger expected payment with the appeals 
process. 
  31 
Case VII:  0 3 > λ  and  0 4 > λ . 
 Since  0 4 > λ ,  . Therefore,   and  0 =
H
H T 0 >
A
H T 0 5 = λ . Substituting  0 5 = λ  into 
(A5) provides 
  ) 1 )( ( 2 3 H H
H H
L L p
p a
p a
− − = μ λ λ .                           (A16) 
Substituting (A16) into (A6) provides 
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0 6 > λ  suggests that  . In addition,  0 =
A
L T 0 3 > λ  suggests that  . 
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Constraints IRL and ICL2 require  
 
L L L
L L A
H p a p
Q e
T
) 1 (
) , (
−
≥
α
.                            (A19) 
For (A19) to hold, we must have 
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(A20) indicates  0 1 = λ . Substituting  0 1 = λ  into (A2), (A3), (A4), and (A5) and jointly 
solving these equations provides  
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Since  0 4 > λ , we have 
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Substituting (A18) into the principal’s objective function provides 
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(A23) suggests that the employer’s expected payment is increasing in  and   and 
decreasing in 
H p L p
L
H
a
a
. 
                                                                    
2. A costly appeals process. 
  The Lagrangian of this problem is as follows. 
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  The first order conditions are: 
0 4 2 0 = + + − − = λ λ λ μ H L H H T p p p H
H D                         (A25) 
0 ) 1 ( 7 3 0 = + + − − = λ λ λ L T p H
L D                           (A26) 
0 2 1 0 = − + + − = λ λ λ μL T
L D                           (A27)  
  330 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 5 3 2 = + − − + − − = λ λ λ μ L L H H H H H H H T p a p a p p a p A
H D                     (A28) 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 6 3 2 = + − − − − + − − − = λ λ λ μ L L H H H H H H H T p a p a p p a p A
L D        (A29) 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 3 2 > − − + − − = C C p C p H H H r λ λ μ D ,  , &  0 > r 0 = r rD                    (A30) 
  There are three valid cases to be analyzed, and all other cases can be ruled out by 
contradictions. 
Case I:  0 3 = λ ,  0 4 = λ  and  0 7 = λ ; 
 Substituting  0 3 = λ ,  0 4 = λ  and  0 7 = λ  into (A25), (A26) and (A27) and jointly 
solving these three equations provides  1 1 = λ  and  H μ λ = 2 . Substituting  H μ λ = 2  and 
0 3 = λ  into (A28) and (A29) provides  0 5 = λ  and  0 6 = λ . 
  1 1 = λ  and  H μ λ = 2  imply that  the constraints IRL and ICH3 are binding. 
Therefore,  
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Equations (A31) and (A32) indicate the employee in expectation receives the 
second-best payoff. Note that equation (A30) always holds, in other words, r  has no 
effect on the result. 
 
Case II:  0 3 > λ ,  0 4 = λ , 0 5 = λ , 0 6 > λ  and  0 7 > λ ; 
0 7 > λ  indicates  .   0 =
H
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  34Substituting 0 5 = λ  into (A28) provides  
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which implies  0 2 > λ  and constraint ICH3 is binding. Therefore, 
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(A33) and (A38) together require 
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When (A39) holds, constraint ICA is not binding, therefore,  0 3 = λ . 
The contradiction shows that 
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  35Therefore, 
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And substituting (A40) and (A41) into (A26) and (A27) provides 
H H H L L L L H L L L H p a p p p a p p p a p p ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 7 − − − = − λ .                  (A42) 
Since 0 7 > λ , (A42) implies 
H
L
L
H
p
p
a
a
−
−
<
1
1
.                                       (A43) 
0 3 > λ  implies  
L L
A
H p a
C r
T
) 1 ( −
= .                            (A44) 
0 2 > λ  implies  
L H
L L
H H
H
H
H p p
C r
p a
p a
p e
T
−
− − − − Δ
=
) 1 )( 1 )( 1 (
.                                                    (A45) 
Jointly solving equation (A28) and  (A30) provides 
0 ) 1 ( 3 < − = λ
H H
L L
r p a
p a
C D .                           (A46) 
Therefore,  .  0 = r
L
L L H
H p
Q e
T
) , (α
>  requires  
  36) 1 )( 1 )( 1 (
) , ( 1
r p
p a
p a
Q e
p
p
e
C
H
L L
H H
L L
L
H
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⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
− − Δ
<
α
.                                                      (A47) 
 
Case III:  0 3 > λ ,  0 4 > λ  and  0 7 = λ ; 
 Since  0 4 > λ ,  . Therefore,   and  0 =
H
H T 0 >
A
H T 0 5 = λ . Substituting  0 5 = λ  into 
(A28) and (A29) provides  
[]
0
) 1 ( ) 1 (
3 6 >
− − −
=
H
L L H H H H L L
a
p a p a p a p a
λ λ .                    (A48) 
0 6 > λ  implies  .  0 =
A
L T
0 3 > λ  implies  
  .                          (A49)  C r T p a T
A
H L L
H
L ) 1 ( − − =
From (A28), we have  
0
) 1 (
) 1 ( 3
2 >
−
+ −
=
H H H
L L H H H H
p a p
p a p a p λ μ
λ ,                      (A50) 
i.e., constraint ICH3 is binding.  Therefore, we have 
. 
L L L H H H
H L A
H p a p p a p
C r p p e
T
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 )( (
− − −
− − − Δ
= .                                                  (A51) 
Constraint IRL requires  
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C r p Q e
T
) 1 (
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−
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≥
α
.          (A52) 
Therefore, 
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) , ( 1
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⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
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−
−
−
− Δ
≤
α
.                                (A53) 
When (A53) holds,  0 1 = λ . Substituting  0 1 = λ  into (A25) and (A26). From (A25), 
(A26), (A27) and (A28), we have 
L L L H H H
H L L L L H H H
p a p p a p
p p a p p p a p
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
4 − − −
− − −
= λ  and                              (A54) 
L L L H H H
L H H H
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p p a p
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
3 − − −
− −
= λ .                       (A55) 
0 3 > λ  and  0 4 > λ  require 
 
H
L
L
H
p
p
a
a
−
−
≥
1
1
.                                       (A56) 
  It can be shown that  0 ) 1 ( 3 < − = C
p a
p a
H H
L L
r λ D . Therefore,  0 = r . 
 
II. Proof of Proposition 5.  
Properties (i) and (ii) have been shown in the analysis of Case III. The proofs of 
Properties (iii) – (v) are as follows. 
  In Case III, the employer’s expense is 
e C p
p a p p a p
C r p p e
p a p EX H H H
L L L H H H
H L
L L L Δ + + − +
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
− − −
− − − Δ
− = μ μ ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 )( (
) 1 ( . 
  (A57) 
  Since the employer’s expense without the appeals process is  
  38e
p
p
L
H
H Δ
−
+ )
1
1
(μ , the appeals process is valuable if and only if  e
p
p
EX
L
H
H Δ
−
+ < )
1
1
(μ . 
It can be shown that the appeals process is always valuable and the principal’s welfare is 
increasing in C when   and the opposite is true when  0 = r 1 = r  and   is sufficiently 
large. 
C
It can be readily shown that  0 <
L
H
a
a
d
dEX
. 
Further, from the analysis for the costless appeals process, by continuity, EX  can 
increase in   for sufficiently small C.  H p
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